




THE NCO LEADERSHIP CENTER OF EXCELLENCE



ULTIMA TIMES

SEPTEMBER 2018





ULTIMA Times

The official newsletter of The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence

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Front Cover: Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmy J. Sellers, commandant, provides motivation for the morning's unit run welcoming Sergeants Major Course Class 69.



THE NCO LEADERSHIP CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

“HOME OF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION”

“TO PROVIDE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION THAT
DEVELOPS ENLISTED LEADERS INTO FIT, DISCIPLINED, WELL-EDUCATED
PROFESSIONALS CAPABLE OF MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF AN
INCREASINGLY COMPLEX WORLD.”





Photo by David Crozier, Command Communications

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A NOTE FROM THE COMMANDANT

Greetings from the NCO Leadership Center of Excellence!

We're off to a fantastic start this academic year. I would like to begin this edition of the newsletter by thanking the staff and faculty of all the courses we facilitate training and education for. To the commandants and directors of the Basic Leader Course, Master Leader Course, Sergeants Major Academy and the Battle Staff Course, many thanks for all of the hard work and efforts in helping us to effectively develop, integrate and deliver training and education readiness to the Army. The NCOs, Soldiers, and civilians assigned to these courses are exceptional stewards of our profession, and willing take on the challenges of operating in these demanding yet rewarding assignments. I think it goes without saying, I'm truly proud and honored to be a member of this great team.

If there is one thing that's constant in our Army, it's change. With that said, I want to take a few minutes of your time to provide updates to a few of the courses which will occur in the immediate future.

For starters, the Basic Leader Course (BLC) which I commonly refer to as the "Foundation," began training the redesigned program of instruction (POI) Aug 1, at each of our 34 BLC NCOAs. On all accounts, the feedback from the students who attended the course has been positive. Soldiers expressed enjoyment in the fact the redesigned course teaches them how to become trainers. This is very important as our Army gets back to the fundamentals of teaching Soldiers how to plan, prepare, execute and resource training. The Basic Leader Course is doing exactly what it was designed to do. In addition to teaching Soldiers how to become trainers, the course is building confidence in Soldiers to lead and train everything from physical readiness to individual training. The redesigned course also introduces the Experiential Learning Model (ELM) which teaches Soldiers how to think, not what to think. There are tremendous benefits of the new learning model, the biggest is Soldiers will become better leaders, trainers, communicators, team builders



**Command Sgt. Maj.
Jimmy J. Sellers**





and thinkers, which is required of them to be successful while operating in multi domains, both on and off the fields of battle.

On Aug 10, we welcomed 639 highly-motivated master sergeants from all three compos into the resident Sergeants Major Course – Class 69, whose motto is “Be the Difference.” This SMC class also comprises 59 international students from 41 partner nations, seven students from our Sister Services – two Air Force, two Coast Guardsmen, and three from the Marine Corps. The U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy team is very excited about the diversity of this class and looks forward to helping them achieve all of their goals.

Lastly, as we prepare to unveil the first level in a series of Distributed Leader Courses (DLC) that will replace the legacy Structured Self Development courses (SSD), I want to describe how introducing DLC Level I is going to occur beginning in Oct.

First, Soldiers currently enrolled in SSD I will remain enrolled for a period of six months after DLC I is made available in ALMS (Oct 2018). If Soldiers do not complete SSD I after six months they will be disenrolled. At that point only SPC will be re-enrolled into DLC I. No action is required other than Soldiers continue to complete the course. If SSD I has been completed Soldiers will not be required to take DLC I, but are encouraged to take it as the course is tied to the redesigned Basic Leader Course and will only help them better understand the material taught.

Second, once DLC I is cut over to ALMS, Soldiers in the grade of E-1 through E-3 will no longer be auto-enrolled. Only SPC will be enrolled into DLC I from the date available in ALMS for enrollment.

Third, Soldiers entering the Army as a SPC will be enrolled into DLC I at 18 months TIS. Finally, Soldiers will be enrolled by their respective component (Active, National Guard, Reserves) into DLC I upon promotion to SPC. Completion of the course is a prerequisite to promotion board appearance to sergeant.

As you can see, there has been a significant overhaul to our NCOPDS. As leaders, I ask that you constantly keep Soldiers informed, making them aware of what's about to occur. This will help ease the anxiety in what they are about to experience. Before long this will become a matter of routine and changes will be transparent. Until then, we cannot over-communicate enough with each other.

Many thanks again for your time and if you have any questions, please feel free to contact us. 🇺🇸

Jimmy J. Seller

Picture perfect!



A unique ice sculpture welcomed the international students and family members of Sergeants Major Course Class 69 at the Fort Bliss Centennial Club in August. The event was put on by the CoE as a means to not only welcome the internationals, but to also provide a means for the spouses to get to know each other and obtain information about programs available to them.

Photo by David Crozier, Command Communications

REDESIGNED BASIC LEADER COURSE: CHANGING PARADIGMS



The redesigned Basic Leader Course is one of several NCO Professional Military Educations courses that is changing the way the Army educates its enlisted leaders. Above, Staff Sgt. Marquita Davis, a facilitator at the 101st Airborne NCO Academy, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, observes students in the classroom work through a problem using team dynamics and collaboration.

By David Crozier, Command Communications

Since the development of the Primary Leadership Course in the late 1970s, the way to train potential junior leaders has been as regimented as the way Soldiers learn how to fire their weapons. Teaching consisted of instructors imparting step-by-step procedures of how to's without the why's and consequences of failure to achieve mission success. A normal 2-hour block of instruction consisted of "Death by Power-Point". With the newly redesigned Basic Leader Course, now being taught using the Experiential Learning Model at every NCO Academy, that paradigm is a thing of the past.

"I think today's course is more on target and more on line with what adult learning should be and that is backed up by educational theory," Theresa "Tess" Spagna, BLC course manager, Directorate of Curriculum Development, NCO Leadership Center of Excellence, said. "The Experiential Learning Model is not facilitator-centric, it's student-centric and research shows that if [students] are engaged, if they are responsible for their learning, they retain it."

Spagna said that is exactly what the redesigned BLC does – education in a collaborative, safe, environment where students are able to open up to one another and discuss things.

"They are learning things and find things on their own. Facilitators are there to guide them in the right direction," she said. "It's like the old saying, we are no longer the sage on the stage, we are the guide on the side."

Focused on the six Leader Core Competencies of Readiness, Leadership, Training Management, Com-

munications, Operations, and Program Management, the redesigned Basic Leader Course is designed to build leader and trainer skills needed to lead a team-size element; while providing the foundation for further development along the Professional Military Education learning continuum. Spagna who has been on the ground floor of the redesigned course and its implementation, said the BLC of today is far better than the old lecture-style of instruction.

“I think we have a much better product for our customer which is the promotable E4. Before you were going to a leadership course with all these PowerPoint slides and you are not going to take it all in. I have seen as many as 80 slides. That’s a lot to just throw at somebody with no collaboration,” she said referring to the former method of instruction. “I believe we are at the pinnacle of what adult learning is and we are providing them with a superior product. We are not just training Soldiers, we are educating them.”

The BLC is a 22-academic day course consisting of 169 academic hours taught in four phases. It begins with Foundations phase where the students receive a course overview, learn about group dynamics, are introduced to Physical Readiness Training (PRT), drill and ceremonies, critical thinking and problem solving, effective listening, written communication, training management and conduct training, and take the Army Physical Fitness Test, soon to be the Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT).

“In Foundations they are given an overview of how the course is going to take place, everyone of the topic areas, what the lesson is,” she said. “They get everything they need to know to make them successful. Foundations sets the tone. Then you have the Leadership phase.”

The Leadership phase teaches the students about the Army’s Leadership Requirements Model, public speaking, counseling, Army Values, Ethics, integration of Soldier 2020, legal responsibilities and limits of NCO authority, followership and servant leader fundamentals, and team building and conflict management.

“The Leadership Phase, that’s where we go into the Leadership Requirements Model and learn about the attributes and the competencies of what we want leaders to have and reflect,” Spagna said. “Then they go into the Readiness Phase.”

In this phase students are taught mission orders and troop leading procedures, Soldier for Life Transition Assistance Program, Soldier readiness, resiliency, and command supply discipline.

Course Map

Seq	Lesson	Title	Hours	Phase
1	B100	Basic Leader Course Overview/Blackboard Review	3	Foundations (Base Group)
2	B101	Group Dynamics	3	
3	B111	Introduction to Physical Readiness Training (PRT)	19	
4	B114	Drill and Ceremonies	6	
5	B123	Army Physical Fitness Test	3	
6	B105	Critical Thinking and Problem Solving	4	
7	B102	Effective Listening	3	
8	B103	Written Communication <i>*Assignment due in Assessment Phase</i>	13	
9	B116	Training Management/Conduct Individual Training <i>*8 of the 16 hours evaluated in Assessment Phase</i>	16	
10	B108	Cultural Competence	4	
11	B106	The Army’s Leadership Requirements Model	4	Leadership (1st Rotation)
12	B104	Public Speaking <i>*4 of the 12 hours evaluated in Assessment Phase</i>	12	
13	B107	Counseling	7	
14	B109	Army Values, Ethics, and Integration of Soldier 2020	5	
15	B110	Legal Responsibilities and Limits of NCO Authority	4	
16	B112	Followership and Servant Leadership Fundamentals	6	
17	B113	Team Building and Conflict Management	7	
18	B115	Mission Orders and Troop Leading Procedures	5	Readiness (2nd Rotation)
19	B117	Soldier for Life / Transition Assistance Program <i>*1 of the 4 hours evaluated in Assessment Phase</i>	4	
20	B119	Soldier Readiness	6	
21	B121	Resiliency	6	
22	B118	Command Supply Discipline Program	5	
23	B122	End of Course Essays (includes two 500-word reflective essays, the SHARP essay turn-in) <i>Due: Information Paper (B103), Information Brief (B104), Conduct Individual Training (B116), and Resume (B117)</i>	24	Assessment (Return to Base Group)

The BLC is conducted in four phases with three rotations: Foundations (Base Group), Leadership (1st Rotation), Readiness (2nd Rotation), and Assessment (3rd Rotation returning to Base Group). Soldiers will rotate to a new classroom with new facilitators at the beginning of each phase.

“This phase deals with resiliency, how to take resiliency out to the force,” she said. “We are giving them resources, command supply discipline, stewardship of the profession and steward of the resources that the profession uses.”

In the final phase, the Assessment Phase, the students write their end of course essays which includes two 500-word reflective essays and turn in a SHARP (Sexual Harassment/Assault Response Program) essay. All assessments, some are executed during the Leadership and Readiness phases, are done through observation of their written essays and communication, public speaking, conducting training, and leadership abilities. The course uses competency-based assessments replacing the former multiple-choice tests.

“Multiple choice is really a 50/50 game. If you have four answers you get rid of the one that is definitely not it. You get rid of the other one you know is not it which leaves you with a 50/50 shot. And when you are done you File 13 it,” she said. “With this course they are actually writing about their different leadership topics; they are doing compare and contrast essays regarding servant leadership and followership; they are teaching individuals PRT. In my opinion, the greatest part of this is that at the very end of the course is the essay, which in non-graded, about everything they have learned – writing, speaking, coaching, mentoring – all the things they learned. It is not just about the GPA, it is about what was important to them, what did they learn and experience.”

For those who teach BLC at the NCO academies, the change in both instruction and student participation is dramatic.

“I can tell you from previously attending the old course – WLC – and also having been a facilitator for the former BLC, it has changed dramatically,” Sgt. 1st Class Jeffery Delay, chief of training at the Fort Bliss NCO Academy said. “When I say dramatically, it is the way we facilitate and educate our students. Now our students are learners and we are using that learner-centric environment.”



Physical Readiness Training is an integral part of force readiness and introduced to the Soldiers during Phase I of the redesigned Basic Leader Course. Students are also required to take an Army Physical Fitness Test. Above, Soldiers of Basic Leader Course Class 009-18, Fort Bliss NCO Academy, take part in PRT.



Students work as a team using their collective experiences to solve complex problems. Above, the students attending the Basic Leader Course at the Fort Bliss NCO Academy discuss how to solve the puzzle to meet the objective. This exercise demonstrates group dynamics.

tive learning environment.

"I would say it is an awakening of the knowledge they have. Because if you look at it from the student viewpoint, from all the feedback we are getting, a lot of the information we are presenting to this current generation of Soldiers, and yes some have college experience and have written essays, but with the old BLC and Warrior Leader Course, you were seen and not heard. Everything was battle drills," he said. "Now we are asking this generation of Soldiers to reconceptualize everything which is a big deal. In talking with

Delay said the students are taught skills to help them think more clearly, more critical, and the students become more agile when it comes to answering questions regarding problem solving.

"Students are allowed to share and collaborate within the classroom. It is no longer the days where I am going to tell you how to learn," he said. "Now it is you understanding what you are learning and being able to learn from each other, not just the facilitator."

The facilitation part, Delay said, is only about 20 percent of just that, facilitators asking questions to create discussion among the students.

"The big difference before was we were telling students how they were going to learn, and it was I am going to do this because you are telling me this is what I need to do," Delay said. "Now I am being able to discover for myself or share that experience I have. So as a facilitator it was hard to change from being what we called an instructor back then, to facilitator today, to know how to actually guide the students in discussion."

Staff Sgt. Raymond Furr, Quality Assurance NCO for the Fort Bliss NCO Academy, likened the changed in style of instruction and course design to an awakening – going from a do as I say instruction to a collabora-

"It's neat to watch them have these conversations in class and they come to the knowledge themselves. The light bulb just pops."

— **Theresa Spagna, BLC Course Manager**

the Soldiers, it was almost like system overload for them with the concepts."

Furr said the facilitators are doing an excellent job of transforming the students into critical thinkers, trainers.

"The Soldiers you have now are going to take this back to their units. They are going to start imple-

menting what they learned, and they are going to start developing their Soldiers,” he said. “By FY20 we are going to have Soldiers coming to the course with a clear understanding of what to expect.”

Delay said the Soldiers of today are institutionalized in the old way of learning – do it because I told you to do it.

“There is an institutional culture in the way they deliver training. If we can get the units to transform how they deliver their Sergeants Time training, their Warrior Tasks and how they are conducting their classes, then the Soldiers will already be open to the Experiential Learning style,” he said. “At BLC there are no longer Skill Level I tasks being taught. This is Skill Level II course. So, when they leave this institution they already have the knowledge, skills and attributes to go back and be trainers. There is no more learning a task that I should have learned in my unit.”

Furr said with the redesigned BLC, there are no longer students falling asleep at their computers, or I am not interested, and I am not retaining anything. With the new BLC students get involved and mature as future leaders.

“At the beginning of the course we get the ones who don’t talk or have anything to say or maybe isn’t at the highest speaking or articulation level,” he said. “By the end of the course that Soldier is in the middle of the conversation because the [facilitators and their peers] developed them. Now they know how to talk to people. The maturity level in just 22 days – I think we are producing more critical thinkers, but more mature younger leaders to put back out in the force.”

Spagna said students come to the course with knowledge through their experiences in and out of the Army that applies to leadership. The course helps them to bring that knowledge forward.

“It’s neat to watch them have these conversations in class and they come to the knowledge themselves,” she said. “The light bulb just pops.”



The Basic Leader Course is the first resident Professional Military Education course within the NCO Professional Development System. Above, the students of BLC Class 08-18 sit patiently during their graduation ceremony waiting for their names to be called to go on stage and receive their certificate of completion.

DAVENPORT INDUCTED INTO NCOL CoE HALL OF HONOR

Story and photos by David Crozier, Command Communications

The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence recognized Command Sgt. Maj. David Davenport in “rock star” fashion, August 23, for his contributions to the education, training and lineage of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps and NCO Education System by inducting him into The NCOL CoE Hall of Honor. Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmy J. Sellers, commandant of the Center of Excellence, hosted the event and who also kept the pending honor a secret from Davenport up until the event.

“Command Sgt. Maj. David Davenport is a great family man and an all-around Soldiers’ Soldier. He loves training Soldiers and NCOs,” Sellers said. “But as the Training and Doctrine Command, command sergeant major, he made a paradigm shift in the way we train Soldiers and educate noncommissioned officers. There is a difference there.”

Sellers said that as the TRADOC command sergeant Major, Davenport would not take “no” for answer as he led TRADOC and the Army down the path to victory in the name of NCO professional development and NCO education.

“There is no one more deserving of this award than command sergeant major Davenport. Before his time, there was no change to the NCO Education System for 43 years,” he said. “Now because of the recent changes he instituted there won’t be a need for change for some time to come.”

Sellers then displayed for all to see, a few of the major changes Davenport, an avid baseball fan, was instrumental in bringing to the forefront – The NCO 2020 Strategy as the key architect, introduction of the Career Map for all enlisted Soldiers, the redesign of the Basic Leader Course, the creation and launching of the Master Leader Course, and the creation of the Distributed Leader Course.

“To summarize his career of 35 years is hard to do,” Sellers said. “I just wanted to show you a snapshot what he has done,”

Concluding his remarks, Sellers thanked his mentor and offered him the stage to say a few words.



Command Sgt. Maj. David Davenport points to his picture and biography hanging in the Hall of Honor in the NCO Leadership Center of Excellence. Davenport was inducted into the Hall of Honor August 23 during ceremonies held at the Center of Excellence. Davenport was selected to receive the honor based on his career of training, mentoring and improving the education of the NCO Corps.

"I think baseball teaches you a lot in life," said Davenport still reeling from the surprise of the honor bestowed to him. "You step up to the batter's box every game, sometimes you strike out, sometimes you hit a home run, and sometimes you get hit by a pitch. But it's all about the team."

Davenport then acknowledge the surprise saying he was really caught off guard and is humbled by the honor. "It's about the team and I have a really great team around me."

"I am very honored to get this from you all, especially as tomorrow is my last day in the Army," he said. "Hopefully you all will go out there after you graduate from this great institution and keep the ball moving forward because it takes a champion to keep [it] moving down the field."

Davenport exclaimed that it was a true team effort, that he was just the mouthpiece, and now the Army and the NCO Corps cannot just sit back and enjoy the ride.

"We are doing all of these great things to not continue to press on with them," he said. "Out there in the crowd, [Class 69], you are going to have to do it. It all starts when you get your battalions. I think battalion leadership is the most important – you have to be responsible for your NCO professional Development, not TRADOC."

Davenport informed the audience and the Sergeant Major Course students that Soldier education is not a waiting game, that leadership must take the initiative to prepare Soldiers, identify who is ready and who is not, and get them to school.

"Attendance to schools is not a right. It is a privilege and you are the keepers of the future of the Corps," he said. "I am trusting you to keep this thing moving for the next 20 years."

The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence Hall of Honor was established in May 2006, with the purpose of providing a highly visible and prestigious means of recognizing individuals who significantly contributed either to the Sergeants Major Academy or to the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System.

Inductees must have served meritoriously in a position of great responsibility and provided service distinguished by meritorious achievement and significant improvements, or enhancements, to existing programs or procedures.

Additional photos of this event can be found on our Flickr site at <https://www.flickr.com/photos/sgmacademy/> albums. 🇺🇸



Command Sgt. Maj. David Davenport was inducted into the NCO Leadership Center of Excellence Hall of Honor for his career of training, mentoring and improving the education of the NCO Corps. Above, Davenport (center) stands next to his Hall of Honor Plaque. Also pictured are Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmy Sellers, NCOL CoE commandant (l); Command Sgt. Maj. (Ret) Don Thomas, Hall of Honor member (2nd from right); and Command Sgt. Maj. Michael Henry, NCOL CoE deputy commandant (r).

EDUCATING TODAY'S LEADERS FOR TOMORROW

NCOL CoE WELCOMES SMC CLASS 69 FOR GROUND-BREAKING YEAR



The NCO leadership Center of Excellence welcomed the 639 students of Sergeant Major Course Class 69 during ceremonies held August 10. Among the class are 59 international students from 41 partner nations as well as two members of the U.S. Air Force, two members of the U.S. Coast Guard and three members of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Story and photos by David Crozier, Command Communications

The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence and U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy welcomed another iteration of students for the exclusive Sergeants Major Course, August 10. Gathered in the Cooper Lecture Center the 639 students of Class 69, including 59 international students from 41 partner nations, ceremoniously began their 10-months of instruction.

Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmy J. Sellers welcomed the group and thanked them for their attendance.

Sellers began his remarks outlining some of the major accomplishments in the Army and NCO education over the past year – revamping the Army Physical Fitness Test into the Army Combat Fitness Test, revamping the entire NCO Education System, redesigned the Basic Leader Course, preparing to roll out the Distributed Leader Course – we are changing the way we educate the Soldiers in our Army, he said. You have to be inspired.

“What you are going to learn in the class,” Sellers said, “You are going to grow, develop and mature years beyond what you are expected to be right now. A lot of that is going to be codified with the instructors that you see before and behind you.”



The NCO leadership Center of Excellence welcomed the 639 students of Sergeant Major Course Class 69 during ceremonies held August 10. Command Sgt. Maj. Timothy Guden, Training and Doctrine Command, was the guest speaker for the event and challenged the students to “be a good example.”

Sellers added this is a ground-breaking year in terms of the education the students will receive. He told them they were the part of the accreditation period to see if the NCOL CoE will be able to award a Bachelor of Arts in Leadership and Workforce Management. He then introduced the guest speaker for the event, Command Sgt. Maj. Timothy Guden, TRADOC command sergeant major.

“Now that you are here at this point, understand the incredible opportunity you have,” he said. “You have an opportunity while you are here for these 10 months to make a difference and to do all those things the Army wants you to do. Welcome to the most professional year that you are going to experience. Make it count”

“It is hard, this life of being a Soldier. It’s meant to be hard. It requires a lot of discipline to continue on every single day.”

Command Sgt. Maj. Timothy Guden

Guden said he didn’t want to take up much of their time but wanted to leave them with a few things.

“First is keep in mind what success is. Some of you may think you haven’t reached success yet,” he said. “I will tell you that when it comes to rank. Position, and service, you have no doubt reached success.”

Hard Work – “It is hard, this life of being a Soldier. It’s meant to be hard. It requires a lot of discipline to continue on every single day,” Guden said. “Those who don’t work hard or remain disciplined quite honestly when the music stops they don’t have a chair to sit in.”

Continued Success – “With continued success comes increased responsibility, not increased rights and privileges,” he said. “Everyone of you have been given the opportunity to continue to serve. The NCO Creed is the NCO Creed for all NCOs. It is our responsibility to do what is simply outlined in the NCO Creed and as we achieve the next rank, we build on those same responsibilities.”

He added, the responsibilities do not diminish as we continue to be successful, they compound. No that it is a privilege and an honor to continue to serve in capacities such as first sergeant or a sergeant major.

Guden told the students to do some introspection on what it means to be a sergeant major, discuss it among one another. It is easy to describe what a sergeant major does. You can pull out anyone’s duties and responsibilities, he said. But what is a sergeant major truly for, what is their role in the formation?


“Twenty five percent of what you know about a sergeant major is what you want to emulate. That what you have seen from other sergeants major.”

Ultimately, he said, their role as a sergeant major will, be determined by the officers you work for.

“They want you to be the trainers, standard bearers and the discipline enforcers. They want their Soldiers to be tough, to be hard, to be gritty, to be gritty professionals and experts in their crafts,” he said. “And they want from us sergeants major to lead Soldiers of that caliber.

In his closing, Guden told the students that within the next four years they will be out in the Army at the battalion level mentoring and setting the example for other NCOs they meet.

“Work hard,” he said, “To ensure that your role model is really and emulation. Be a good example.”

Additional photos of this event can be viewed at <https://www.flickr.com/photos/133821783@N02/albums> 

NCOL CoE CELEBRATES FELLOWSHIP GRADUATION OF COHORT #3

By David Crozier
Command Communications

Continuing the legacy, the 18 students of Cohort #3 of The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence Fellowship Program, were awarded their Master's Degree in Adult Education and Lifelong Learning from The Pennsylvania State University during ceremonies held August 21, in the Center's Cooper Lecture Center.

Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmy J. Sellers, commandant of USASMA, lauded the student's achievements, and thanked all who supported the program. He opened his remarks with a quote from former First Lady Michelle Obama.

"You have to stay in school. You have to. You have to go to college. You have to get your degree. Because that's the one thing people can't take away from you is your education. And it is worth the investment. End quote," Sellers said. "It's all about lifelong learning. I think we have hit the jackpot, not from a monetary aspect, but from the professional impact that you are going to have on the force."

Sellers told the graduates they were no longer the student.

"You are a warrior scholar," he said. "You will coach, teach and mentor the future of the Army, shape lives and thought and be the subject matter experts on Army doctrine. You will be the difference."

Completing his comments, Sellers introduced the guest speaker for the event, Dr. Michael G. Moore, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Education, Pennsylvania State University.

Moore began his remarks by noting he was an Adult Educator first and foremost and congratulated the students for joining him with their degree in adult education and lifelong learning. He also lauded the spouses and family members who supported their graduates throughout their year of study.

"I know very well the part played by you as the back home supporters of this educational enterprise," he said. "The collateral damage of evenings spent apart, weekend trips that you did not take, vacations that were cut short. I hope today's celebration will pay great attention to your families and friends and we thank you for your support."

Moore continued noting the long history of the evolution of distance education, something he has had a long relationship with and helped to evolve into what is now Penn State's World Campus.

"When [distance education] is done right, this form of teaching ends up paradoxically as more individualized, more personal, than can be achieved by even the best instructors in the large campus lecture environment," Moore said. "There is something special about the distance learning experience – the respect for autonomy and independence. You know what you have learned through self-motivation, self-discipline;



The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence celebrated Cohort #3 of the Fellowship program for successfully completing their Master's Degree in Adult Education and Lifelong Learning. These warrior scholars will now move on to be instructors in the Sergeants major Course.

Photo by Spc. James C. Seals




Guest speaker for the celebration was Michael G. Moore, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Education, Pennsylvania State University. Moore, an early pioneer of distance education, told the students the way they learned was "paradoxically as more individualized, more personal, than can be achieved by even the best instructors in the large campus lecture environment."

Photo by Spc. James C. Seals

campus. The degree earned as a World Campus student is identical to the one awarded to all of the Penn State graduates on campus.

The NCOL CoE drives Change for Enlisted Soldier development and is responsible for developing, maintaining, teaching, and distributing five levels of Enlisted Professional Military Education – Introductory, Primary, Intermediate, Senior and Executive. Each level best prepares the soldier to fight and win in a complex world as adaptive and agile leaders and trusted professionals of Force 2025.

NCOL CoE is currently accepting applications for Cohort #5 of the Fellowship. Please read the message at <http://ncolcoe.armylive.dodlive.mil/files/2018/07/USASMA-Fellowship-message-for-BOP.docx> for more information about applying for the Fellowship.

Additional photos of the event can be found on NCOL CoE's Flickr site at <https://www.flickr.com/photos/sgmacademy/albums>. 

skills that will prove a tremendous asset in your future work as trainers and in your personal studies in the years ahead."

Moore concluded. "Today is not only a university diploma that we should celebrate, but the way in which you earned the diploma – that is through a distance teaching program, the most advanced form of higher education, or better yet I dare say, is America's most competent distance teaching university – a Penn State University that you graduated from. Very sincere congratulations to you all."

The members of Cohort #3 of the NCOL CoE. Fellowship Program are: Sgts. Maj. Larry E. Addington, Michael M. Brosch, Gloria J. Cain, Roger L. Craig, Dwalyn E. Dasher, Jermaine F. Davison, Gerardo Dominguez, David A. Galati. Barbara A. Griggs, Mario F. Guerrero, Richard E. Larson, Deitrek G. Louis, Anthony J. Martinez, Robert A. McConnell, Robert A. Nelson, Melissa A. O'Brien, Christopher L. Padgett, and Timothy J. Ros.

The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence Fellowship Program is the first of its kind for enlisted soldiers and demonstrates the Army's overall commitment to improving its education programs and developing agile, adaptive and innovative enlisted leaders. Pennsylvania State University is a Tier 1 university and its online world campus provided our fellows the quality academic experience, and the convenience and flexibility they require. Their online courses are the same academically challenging courses taught on



The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence celebrated the educational accomplishments of Cohort #3 of the Fellowship Program during ceremonies August 21. Each fellow earned a Master's Degree in Adult Education and Lifelong Learning from The Pennsylvania State University. Above, Sgt. Maj. Mario F. Guerrero poses for a picture during the celebration.

Photo by Spc. James C. Seals

SLDC – A COURSE FOR SENIOR SPOUSES



The Spouse Leadership Development Course prepares senior enlisted spouses for their roles as part of the leadership support element in the military community. Above, Shaunette Sellers (l), spouse of Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmy Sellers, commandant of The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence; and Michelle Mebane (r), director of the course, work as a team to ensure the students leave with all the tools they need to be successful in that role.

Story and photo by David Crozier, Command Communications

“The strength of our nation is our Army. The strength of our Army is our Soldiers. The strength of our Soldiers is in our families. ... The selfless dedication and commitment of Army families directly contributes to the readiness of our Soldiers. Families are the force behind the force.” Source: **U.S. Army Families**

To ensure the Army is ready, it trains, educates and equips its most lethal weapon, the Soldier. Today the same can be said for the “force behind the force” through the Spouse Leadership Development Course offered at The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence and the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. The course, similar to the Sergeants Major Course though not as in-depth, prepares senior enlisted spouses for their roles as part of the leadership support element in the military community - all in the name of readiness.

“The Soldier is about to go out from this academy at different levels of leadership – Sergeant Major or Command Sergeant Major. The spouses have to be there to support them and to support them they need to know their role,” Michelle Mebane, SLDC course director said. “Many of these spouses are coming from being the head of the Family Readiness Group and now as [senior enlisted spouses] they are going to be the advisors and mentors to these groups. That is part of what is being taught in this course, how to be a mentor and an advisor.”

SLDC covers a wide array of topics to help spouses understand the significance of their contributions to family readiness in support of a successful command. Those topics include team building and group dynamics, self-awareness, public speaking, protocol and etiquette, ethics, marriage and the senior spouse, diversity, resiliency, security and social media, and several Army Community Service programs.

“This course helps make the Army increase readiness because it gives the Soldier more time to focus on the mission,” Shaunette Sellers, spouse of Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmy Sellers, NCOL CoE commandant, said. “It helps the spouses to be mentally ready to not have their Soldier with them when they deploy and

how to get out and use the resources that are available.”

Mebane agrees.

“The spouses are supporting their Soldier. When the Soldier is deployed they are the advisor and mentor to those junior [Soldier] spouses helping them to support their Soldiers,” she said. “We show them the resources available to help them when their Soldier is not there, so the Soldier can continue on with the mission.”

“It makes it easier for them being deployed and they are not worried about what is going on with their spouses,” Sellers added. “Just like senior Soldiers take care of their Soldiers downrange, the senior spouses are taking care of the families.”

Sellers said the course not only teaches the spouses how to support their husbands, but is also provides the basic skills they need to be an Army spouse.

“For those spouses who are just married, or haven’t been involved in their Soldier’s life, this course helps to build a foundation,” Sellers, a graduate of the course herself, said. “Whether their spouse is going to be a sergeant major or a command sergeant major, it is important they get the basic knowledge to be able to support the organization and their battle buddy; learn how to work side-by-side with them as a command team. This course actually helped me to realize the true resources that are out there.”

Mebane said classes not only show the spouses how to get the resources they need, but more importantly how to work as a team.

“When you go out there in the real world working with that other person, that officer’s spouse, that team is so important,” she said. “You cannot do it all by yourself; you cannot go to every FRG meeting; you cannot go to every hospital visit. You need that team and come up with a way to work together. The team is very important.”

Another important part of the course Sellers said, is the leadership panel at the end where senior leaders and spouses discuss their experiences and take questions from the students. One question Sellers received earlier this year was particularly memorable.

“A student asked how do you continue to be a married couple with everything that goes on. That question was true to my heart because I am a family person,” Sellers said. “It was very easy to tell them, you are still the wife, or the husband, so you must still do those wife/husband duties and when you are home you set the tone. You have to cut it off at the door. Home is home for us.”

The Spouse Leadership Development Course is a 40-hour resident leadership support course designed for senior enlisted spouses from the Army, sister services, and allied militaries. Major subject areas include programs in human psychology, human relations training, and leadership development. Spouses also learn healthy conflict management resolution techniques, protocol, public speaking and communication, effective listening, and team building skills. SLDC applies a combination of lecture, discussion, and small group experiential learning methodologies. The course is taught 11 times a year with both day and night classes available. For registration information go to <http://ncolcoe.armylive.dodlive.mil/spouse-leadership-development-course/>.

Course Map

L901: Welcome/Opening Remarks & SLDC Orientation
L902: Team Building: Group Dynamics
L903: Self-Awareness (Learning Style Inventory Workbook)
L904: Public Speaking and Presentations
L905: The Senior Spouse Role in the Family Readiness Group
L906: Leadership & the Senior Spouse
L907: Army Overview (Operational to Strategic Level)
L908: Effective Communication
L909: Protocol and Etiquette
L910: The Senior Spouse Overview of Army Family Programs
L911: Senior Spouse Role in Recruiting & Thanking Volunteers
L912: Security & Social Media
L913: Public Affairs/Media Relations w/ Online Conduct
L914: Deployment Discussion
L915: Survivor Outreach Services
L916: Benefits and Entitlements: Preparing for Retirement
L917: American Red Cross
L918: Ethics
L919: Care Team Training
L920: Marriage and the Senior Spouse
L921: Resilience
L922: Diversity
L923: Problem Solving & Decision Making
L924: Dress for Success
L925: Planning a Reception
L926: After Action Review
L927: Graduation Rehearsal
L928: Senior Spouse Panel
L929: Graduation/Reception Set-up
L930: Graduation

A PATHWAY FORWARD

By **Sgts. Maj. Dennis Collins, Matt Coppi, and Alex Santos**
United States Army Sergeants Major Academy

Deeper learning is synonymous with Army learning and, “Army learning is the act of acquiring, maintaining, or improving knowledge skills, and attitudes to achieve required performance” (TRADOC, 2017, p. 21). The graduates of the United States Army Sergeants Major Course will be able to think critically, apply knowledge, and solve problems under uncertain, complex, and chaotic operational environments. Deeper learning in the context of military leadership emphasizes the use of a leader’s core competencies; the ability to formulate military concepts and principles, and generalization to solve problems and disseminate ideas. More importantly, according to the Army Learning Concept it is important for the students to gain deeper learning because “Effective critical and creative thinking are essen-

tial for successful application of all three Army Planning Methodologies: Troop leading Procedures; Mission Decision Making Process; and the Army Design Methodology” (Army Learning Concept, 2015, p. 21).

Reflection is a crucial phase of action research, and although modeled as the final phase of Mer-
tler’s (2014) action research process, it will continually inform this action research study by providing student-centered opportunities for critical thinking at every level of education. Conducting this action research study also has the potential to provide a significant impact on the ability to observe relationships between content areas not previously noted. The primary aim of the study is to understand United States Army Sergeants Major Course students’ perceptions of Joint International Intergovernmental Multinational operations curriculum and the impact of critical thinking based on a summative assessment during phase III of the J611 Mission Readiness Exercise.

The goals of this research include interests in helping United States Army Sergeants Major Course students increase their knowledge, skills, and abilities to achieve higher levels of cognition during their pursuit of one of the most fundamental learning outcomes (Evaluation), and to aid their development of a substantive view of education in the Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational discipline. Paul and Elder’s (2007) framework for critical thinking and Anderson’s et al. (2001) Revised Bloom’s Taxonomy are crucial to ensuring Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinationals curriculum set the conditions for future senior enlisted leaders in the 21st-Century.

Background of the Problem

As a United States Army Sergeants Major Course Educator, we are required to educate and evaluate each United States Army Sergeants Major Course student on Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational curriculum (i.e., a minimum of every six weeks for a total of six semesters starting in class 69). We as United States Army Sergeants Major Course instructors realize that the gap that exists between theoretical learning and the problem of practice within the force, creates significant gaps. Which leads to the



Sgt. Maj. Matt Coppi, Sgt. Maj. Dennis Collins and Mr. Alex Santos

inability of a United States Army Sergeants Major Course student to critically evaluate and provide advice to superiors, peers, and subordinates concerning the commander's intent and the full spectrum of the elements of mission command as they apply to senior leaders throughout the joint force. This need opens access to a broad range of literature on curriculum theory, curriculum design, and assessment strategies that converge in andragogy theoretical educational principles.

According to Noddings (1983), John Dewey often advised, "Any subject freely undertaken as an occupation as a set of tasks requiring goal-setting, means-ends analysis, choice of appropriate tools and materials, exercise of skills, living through the consequences, and evaluating the results—is educative" (p. 193). As members of an all-volunteer force, Army senior enlisted leaders freely accept the demands of their occupation; however, many are denied a complete education when they are required to follow a one-size-fits-all mentality within the operational enlisted force that by design does not consider the nature of the students' past experiences, learning preferences, environment, or personal background. The proposed qualitative action research study seeks to understand United States Army Sergeants Major Course Educator students' perceptions of the Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational curriculum and determines the impact of student-centered Summative Assessments on students' critical thinking skills after the recommended phase III Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational Mission Readiness Exercise.

Based on current Army Institutional Noncommissioned Officers Professional Development System rote research methods and summative assessments limit the ability to educate senior enlisted leaders at Bloom's level of evaluation. But Summative Assessments and associated rubrics if modified provide an opportunity to go from strictly analyzing to allowing the student to evaluate the effectiveness of a marriage between theories of metacognition and constructivism, with intellectual standards being the rubric for measuring the quality of the students' constructed knowledge. John Dewey (1929) believed rote memorization to be ineffective and that educators should devote their time "training the child's power of imagery and in seeing to it that he was continually forming definite vivid, and growing images of the various subjects with which he comes in contact in his experience" (p. 38).

With this present research we feel that Dewey's constructivist theory is just as important to adult learners as it is to children, but knowledge construction, left to itself, risks creating poor habits of mind or reinforcing erroneous data. For these reasons, this action research study aims to improve senior enlisted leaders' education regarding curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment through a thought-infused and guided constructivism. This idea is present in Dr. Richard Paul and A. J. A Binker's (Socratic Questioning, n.d. teachings:

What we need to do, in contrast, is to stimulate student's thinking right from the start, especially about the most basic ideas in a subject so that they are motivated from the beginning to use their thinking in trying to understand things, and so that they base their thinking on foundational ideas that make sense to them. (p. 372)

Problem Statement

In the United States Army senior enlisted profession, senior enlisted leaders are assigned to organizations where they are required to be the subject matter experts regarding their ability to provide advice to their respective officer counterpart. Their lack of critical thinking skills tied to a curriculum that only expects a student to reach the analyze learning level limits the senior enlisted leader in providing advice that is sound, well thought out, and articulated in a manner that allows for common understanding at the lowest levels of command. Coupled with the requirement to ensure their respective officer counterpart looks at all domains and includes the perspective of the Soldier on the ground a senior enlisted leader must be able to both analyze and evaluate in an environment associated with Mission Command. The life-preserving effect of this advice is the one specific reason all senior enlisted leaders are required to demonstrate near-infallible military expertise in multi-domain operations.

Nearly 100 years ago, famed educator Franklin Bobbitt (1918) stated, "The new age is more in need of facts than the old, and of more facts; and it must find more effective methods of teaching them" (p. 11). In the present research, we argue in favor of Bobbitt's thoughts, adding that teaching students to learn within

each discipline they study is equally, if not more, important. Developing the necessary skills to provide timely evaluated advice and to understand and articulate the capabilities of systems, is a challenging endeavor that requires senior enlisted students to develop and nurture their critical thinking skills. Action Research is cyclical and iterative nature and has reciprocity at its core.

Purpose of the Study

Understanding Sergeants Major Course students' perceptions of curriculum leads to an understanding of the level of thought Sergeants Major Course students' apply towards the subject, and it lends clues to how Summative Assessments might be used in a traditional behaviorist curriculum.

The following research questions, representing separate iterations of the action research cycle, are the recommended guiding principles of this proposed qualitative action research study:

1. What are Sergeants Major Course students' perceptions of Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational curriculum concerning the Experiential Learning Model and andragogy principles? And, 2. What is the impact of Summative Assessments on the critical thinking skills of Sergeants Major Course students regarding Bloom's taxonomy in phase III of the Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational Mission Readiness Exercise?

Ultimately, this proposed study aims to increase vocational performance by helping Sergeants Major Course students develop critical thinking skills, even during the most fundamental of tactical, operational, and strategic tasks. The study's goal of helping Sergeants Major Course students develop a standard of critical thought leading to practice is fundamental to the study, and it is fueled by additional recommendations that are being purposed to encourage continual intellectual growth that would help Sergeants Major Course students further develop their abilities throughout their Senior Leader Careers.

Hypothesis

The study hypothesizes that if action research is conducted in a two-phase scenario using a control group in the first semester made up of 16 Sergeants Major Course students and an experimental group during the second semester of 16 Sergeants Major Course students the results would show that the experimental group would reach the learning level of evaluation. This would be achieved by using the dependent variables of the phase III Mission Readiness Exercise and the independent variable being the associated modified curriculum and rubric to facilitate and perform a final Summative Assessment. In the first semester, the control group would receive no treatment and would only be monitored and evaluated based on the current curriculum. There would also be informal survey data captured from 16 Sergeants Major Course students during the first action research cycle. When the first semester finishes the experimental group of 16 Sergeants Major Course students would be evaluated with the treatment and then evaluated based on the modified curriculum and rubrics set in place for the second-semester evaluation. The difference being during the final assessment the students would be asked questions associated with the learning level of evaluation. From these questions and subsequent interviews of both groups, the action research results would show that the experimental group reached a higher level of learning achievement reaching and processing information through the evaluation lens. This would only be possible through a change in the current curriculum and rubrics allowing the student to reach that desired level of evaluation.

Methodology

This action research study follows a qualitative design that is guided by the following research question: 1) what are the Sergeants Major students' perceptions of the efficacy of education in their professional military educational experience while attending the United States Army Sergeants Major Course? This study proposes using two iterations of the action research cycle to understand Sergeants Major Course students' perceptions of the curriculum and to determine the impact of the Experiential Learning Model and Summative Assessments on their performance and critical thinking abilities. Informal survey data is captured from 16 Sergeants Major Course students during the first action research cycle. After an inferential analysis of the data, an action plan informs the second action research cycle where during the second semester 16

Sergeants Major Course students (i.e., “MSG X,” “MSG Y,” and “MSG Z”) are selected for semi-structured interviews and participation in a guided Summative Assessment during phase III Mission Readiness Exercise. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, data collection during the second cycle include participant-researcher-developed field observations and informal interview data.

Conclusion/Future Results Based Application

The problem of practice identified within this proposal for future research is that every senior enlisted leader assigned to an organization retains critical thinking skills that are essential to the quality of advice given to their officer counterpart. A change in Joint International Intergovernmental Multinational curriculum is needed in the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy portfolio to guide students’ development of deeper learning and critical thinking skills that go beyond analysis and rise to the level of evaluation. The gravity of this requirement is born of the necessity of a need for a United States Army Sergeants Major Academy student to critically evaluate and provide advice to superiors, peers, and subordinates concerning the commanders’ intent and the full spectrum of the elements of mission command as they apply to senior leaders throughout the joint force. The life-preserving effect of this is important to ensure that students gain deeper learning. Ultimately the goal is to educate all future senior enlisted leaders to go beyond the learning level of analyze and be able to critically ascend all levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy. This would ensure that the Soldier on the ground never pays the ultimate price for not critically assessing the multi-domain battlefield.

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Our Mission

Provide professional military education that develops enlisted into fit, disciplined, well-educated professionals capable of meeting the challenges of an increasingly complex world.

Our Vision

The premier institution driving innovative development for enlisted leaders; constantly focused on readiness.

THE VALUE OF INFLUENCE

By Master Sgt. Kenneth Farley
Class 68, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy

Influence is the aptitude to alter another person's beliefs, values, actions, or thoughts. When you get another person to change their thought process based on your opinions and beliefs, you have gained the skill to influence. The purpose of this paper is to discuss why it is important to have the ability to influence others. Not everyone has this skill. It takes more than being in a leadership position to get someone to do something you want him or her to do. This is something that can take time to establish, build, and maintain. It is imperative that a leader develop the ability to influence others. "When leaders inspire, they are able to motivate employees to do more than those employees originally intended and often even more than they thought possible" (Dennis & Meola, 2009, p. 10). In order for leaders to be effective, they have to have the skill of influence to lead others.

Power

The power of influence is not something that comes with the title of leader. Either you have the skill or you do not. There are two ways to get people to do what you want them to do. A leader exercises either their personal power or their positional power. Influence and power are the invigorating forces that get things done, and they are the necessary tools of a leader (Dennis & Meola, 2009). Positional power derives from the organization or the position that the leader holds. Personal power exudes from the leader's expert knowledge or their personality trait. A leader that uses power from themselves uses personal power.

Personal Power

With personal power, the leader has the talent to get others to commit to the leader's needs. Getting an individual to commit to a cause is the embodiment of trust within that leader. In order for leaders to gain commitment, they have to have ownership of their cause. In turn, these same leaders have to be able to influence. When leaders work for commitment, their charge is to inspire others. This type of leader works to build trust to subordinates. Building trust to subordinates is just as, if not more valuable than building that trust from subordinates.

Leaders who use personal power generally build teams with people who are committed to the organization. The more people that a leader gets commitment from will equate to a greater amount of passion and energy during mission accomplishment. The subordinates who have gained the leaders trust are then committed to the cause. Leaders are in positions of authority, but it is up to the leader to earn the trust and respect of their subordinates to commit.

Positional Power

When leaders choose to exercise positional power, they risk losing the trust of their subordinates. Influencing using positional power causes others to accomplish tasks by compliance. People comply because the power of authority is used. The difference in a subordinate having to do something rather than wanting to do something is compliance. In today's society, compliance may not work to the advantage of the leader in regards to respect and trust.

When people follow leaders because they have to, the leader only gains short-term compliance. When this type of leadership is in place, there is a much greater need for presence from the leader. Subordinates are more likely to wait on further instructions, thus having short-term compliance. There is no commitment to work beyond current directions. When subordinates operate because they want to, they demonstrate

long-term commitment and disciplined initiative. This initiative of wanting to do more to accomplish the mission results from gaining buy-in. When subordinates gain buy-in, they are more committed to the organizations vision. Organizations must have leaders that are able to influence their subordinates to commit to the vision.

Characteristics of Influence

When leaders create an environment for subordinates to express initiative, it allows the subordinate to feel a sense of empowerment. Empowering leaders invoke the best of others. Subordinates are empowered by certain characteristics that leaders possess. Leaders are more capable of influencing subordinates by being persons of character, integrity, trustworthiness, and service. When leaders shy away from one of these characteristics, it is challenging to recapture the commitment from the subordinates. One of the most important traits an influential leader has is integrity. Integrity leads to trust, trust builds influence and, influence gains commitment.

Conclusion

When subordinates accomplish tasks because of who you are and not simply because of what you are, you have gained the ability to influence through commitment. The overall goal of leadership is to use personal power more than positional power. Personal power creates commitment within the organization. Leaders who influence others by the use of personal power lead by example. Subordinates of these type of organizations invest more in the cause.

Subordinates know their leadership will lead them in the right way. “At the heart of leadership is the leader’s relationship with followers. People will entrust their hopes and dreams to another person only if they think the other is a reliable vessel” (Byers, Slack, & Parent, 2012, p. 39). When exercising personal power, leaders become more effective when they have developed the skill to influence others.

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Do you know the six Leader Core Competencies?

They are

Program Management

Operations

Readiness

Leadership

Communication

Training Management

ARROW AIR FLIGHT 1285

By Master Sgt. Ross H. Eastman II

Class 68, U. S. Army Sergeants Major Academy

Arrow Air Flight 1285 was a United States (U.S.) military charter flight returning 248 Soldiers of 101st Air Assault Division to Fort Campbell, Kentucky from Cairo, Egypt on 12 December 1985. The flight crashed on takeoff following a short layover in Gander, Newfoundland, Canada, killing all 248 passengers and eight crewmembers. The crash was the subject of massive criticism because of the unusual divergence between witness accounts, physical evidence, and the official report from the Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB). Although the CASB accident report listed the probable cause as icing of the wing leading edges, evidence points towards a terror attack linked to the Iran-Contra affair.

Background

On 11 December 1985 at 2035, 248 Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division departed Cairo, Egypt aboard Arrow Air Flight 1285, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-63CF. The Soldiers had just completed a six-month peacekeeping mission in the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers and were returning home to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The flight had a short layover in Cologne, Germany before landing at Gander, Newfoundland, Canada at 0545 on 12 December 1985. The passengers disembarked the aircraft while ground crew refueled and inspected it, then were re-boarded for the final leg of the flight. Arrow Air Flight 1285 took off at 0646 on 12 December 1985, then crashed beyond the Trans-Canada highway only 300 meters from the runway. All 248 passengers and eight crewmembers died instantly; the aircraft destroyed (Ranter, 2018; Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988a). The investigation, spearheaded by the CASB, consumed three years and sparked outrage over a perceived cover-up fueled by the Iran-Contra Scandal.

Iran-Contra Scandal

From August 1985 to March 1987, a political scandal was taking place that, if revealed, would put the Ronald Reagan presidency in jeopardy. The scandal, later referred to as the Iran-Contra scandal or Iran-Contra affair, was the diversion of U.S. weapons through Israel to Iran in a planned exchange for U.S. hostages held in Lebanon by Hezbollah. The plan at its core was for Israel to ship tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles to Iran. The U.S. government would resupply the weapons to Israel in exchange for payment. Rather than receiving full payment for the missiles, Israel diverted a portion of the funds to the Contras. The Contras were the U.S. backed paramilitary guerrilla group fighting the socialist government of Nicaragua (Peters & Woolley, 2018).

Public knowledge of the Iran-Contra dealings had the potential of causing impeachment of President Reagan because the long-standing U.S. policy was not to negotiate with terrorists or terrorist nations. On 9 December 1985, just two days before the Arrow Air Flight 1285 crash, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North sent a memorandum to National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane. In the memorandum, North said of the arms deals that "U.S. reversal now in mid-stream could ignite Iranian fire, hostages would be our minimum losses" (Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network, 1987). A leak resulted in a Lebanese magazine revealing the scandal in November 1986. The subsequent investigation and Congressional inquiries continued for years. The Iran-Contra affair was, at the time, the biggest political scandal since Watergate (Byrne, Kornbluh, & Blanton, 2006).

Within hours following the Arrow Air Flight 1285 crash, the Hezbollah terrorist organization known as Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) claimed responsibility. Both the Canadian and U.S. governments quickly dismissed this claim, although this would not have been the first time Hezbollah was responsible for similar

attacks. Hezbollah hijacked Trans World Airlines Flight 847 while traveling from Cairo, Egypt to San Diego, California on 14 June 1985. The hijackers killed U.S. Navy Diver Robert Stetham and took the remaining passengers and crew hostage. Hezbollah released all hostages following a hostage situation that lasted several days and included multiple flights back and forth from Algiers, Algeria, and Beirut, Lebanon (Smith, 2001). The hijackers escaped except Muhammad Ali Hamadi who police arrested in Germany. Germany sentenced Hamadi to life imprisonment but released him in 2005 (Burns, 2005). He remains on the Federal Bureau of Investigation most wanted list (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2010).

Crash Investigation

The CASB conducted the investigation because the crash occurred in Canada. Discovery revealed conflicting information about what caused Arrow Air Flight 1285 to crash. CASB interviewed several witnesses early in the investigation. Three witnesses who were traveling on the Trans-Canada Highway stated that they observed a yellow/orange glow on the bottom of the aircraft. Two of the witnesses reported that the glow was so bright that it illuminated the interior of their truck cabs. Gander International Airport Manager, John Pittman, said that he saw fire coming from beneath the aircraft before it crashed. A local rental car agent stated that she saw a large orange glow from the aircraft and that it exploded before it hit the ground. Other witnesses reported that the aircraft was free from ice before it took off (Bainerman, 1992).

Air Traffic Controller Glenn Blandford told reporters that he observed the inspection of Arrow Air Flight 1285 by the ground crew moments before it proceeded to the runway for take-off from Gander International Airport. Blandford also said that the aircraft was not de-iced before take-off because it was only at Gander for less than an hour, not enough time for the wings to ice given the weather conditions at the time. Ground crew member Teddy West corroborated the weather conditions and lack of ice on the aircraft surfaces. West told reporters that he inspected the aircraft before take-off and touched the wing surfaces, none of which had any ice accumulation. West would have ordered the aircraft to be de-iced before takeoff if he observed any ice accumulation (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2015). Physical evidence validated witness accounts that suggested an in-flight fire resulting from an onboard explosion.

Arrow Air's insurance agency hired a private insurance investigator to determine the cause of the crash, in parallel with the CASB investigation. The insurance investigator, Irving Pinkel, discovered a hole blown through the right side of the fuselage. The hole was about one foot in diameter and the edges bent outward. The official CASB report mentioned this hole in the fuselage, dismissing it because "the fuselage section showed no damage other than the outward pucker around the hole" (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988a, p. 13). However, further examination revealed further damage around the window frame above the location of the hole. There was evidence of an internal blast that forced the window frame outward. There was also a large hole in the bottom of the fuselage that caused by an internal force as indicated by the outward curling of the metal. The CASB also dismissed this, stating the hole resulted from "an object being forced through the fuselage during breakup" and the curled metal around the hole was the result of "sagging of the structure in the intense heat of the post-crash fire" (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988a, p. 22). As if the witness statements and physical evidence were not enough to prove an onboard explosion and fire, the bodies of the deceased provided clear evidence that a pre-crash fire occurred.

Some of the CASB investigators determined that the force of the crash would have made it impossible for any passengers to survive the initial impact. However, the official CASB report contradicted this by saying that as many as 209 passengers lived for up to five minutes after the crash. The U.S. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology conducted all post-mortem examinations and autopsies, supervised by the CASB. Toxicology tests revealed elevated levels of carbon monoxide in 69 passengers and hydrogen cyanide in 157 passengers (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988a). According to the forensic pathologist, Dr. Richard Shepard, the toxicology reports indicated polyurethane foam, commonly used in aircraft upholstery, was burning before the passengers died (20/20, 2014). The CASB dismissed the medical information as inconclusive because they believed most of the passengers survived the initial impact and instead died from a post-crash fire.

As if the extraordinary amount of witness statements, physical evidence, and toxicology data was not

enough to show in-flight detonation as a probable cause; the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was mysteriously damaged. According to the CASB (1988a), there were two tears in the CVR tape, and the cockpit area microphone was unserviceable. As a result, there was no recording of conversations among the flight crew “from the time pre-flight were commenced until the aircraft crashed” (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988a, pp. 91-92). Although circumstantial, the multiple points of failure in the CVR system and the resultant lack of conversational data raise the very plausible doubt that the cause was icing of the wings; and instead that the actual cause was something neither the U.S. or Canadian governments wanted revealed to the public.

Although the CASB report described the tape damage and non-functional CVR microphone, there was only a vague mention of it in the factual findings, placing the blame on the flight crew. The official CASB report listed 33 findings in their conclusion, including but not limited to:

- “Arrow Air flight crews were not recording all aircraft unserviceabilities [sic] in the aircraft journey log and on occasion were accepting for flight aircraft with known defects”
- “The aircraft was not de-iced prior to take-off”
- “No evidence found of a pre-impact mechanical failure of the number four engine”
- “The balance of evidence did not support the occurrence of a pre-impact fire or explosion either accidental or a result of sabotage” (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988a, pp. 93-95)

The probable cause listed in the official CASB report was “ice contamination on the leading edge and upper surface of the wing. Other possible factors such as a loss of thrust from the number four engine and inappropriate take-off reference speeds may have compounded the effects of the contamination” (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988a, p. 95).

Dissenting Opinion

After the release of the official CASB report that cited the probable cause as icing of the wing leading edges, four members of the CASB investigation team wrote a 21-page dissenting opinion. The dissenting opinion described the professionalism of both the flight and ground crew and indicated that the ground crew had meticulously inspected the aircraft for ice prior to take-off. In fact, the ground crew that refueled the aircraft would have had to touch the wing surfaces, putting them in a position to notice any ice accumulation. Additionally, the dissenting opinion cited several issues with the investigation and conclusion. They described how the aircraft did not stall, that the aircraft’s performance was not consistent with ice on the wings, that systems were failing before the impact, and that physical evidence and witness statements pointed to an in-flight fire or explosion (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988b). The dissenting opinion finally concluded with their findings and probable cause, vastly different than the official CASB report. The dissenting opinion findings were:

- “Flight crew performed without fault”
- “Weight and balance were not factors”
- “Ice contamination was not a factor”
- “The right outboard engine was at low power before impacting the trees”
- “All reverse thrusters may have deployed”
- “A fire started in-flight, possibly from a detonation in the cargo compartment”
- (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988b, p. 14)

The dissenting opinion identified the probable cause of the crash to be “an in-flight fire that may have resulted from detonations of undetermined origin brought about catastrophic system failures” (Canadian Aviation Safety Board, 1988b, p. 14).

Conclusion

The crash of Arrow Air Flight 1285 cost the lives of 256 Americans, including 248 Soldiers from the prestigious 101st Air Assault Division returning from a peacekeeping mission in the Saini. The CASB concluded in their official report that the crash was the result of icing on the leading edges of the wings. However, the CASB either overlooked or dismissed witness statements, physical evidence, toxicology data,

and even claims of responsibility from IJO. Considering the overwhelming evidence pointing to an on-board explosion resulting in a pre-crash fire, the highly controversial and illegal Iran-Contra affair, and the claim of responsibility by IJO within hours after the crash, the only plausible conclusion is that the crash of Arrow Air Flight 1285 was the result of a terrorist attack.

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UKRAINE DELEGATION VISITS NCOL CoE

The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence and U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy hosted a delegation from the Ukraine Ministry of Defense Sept. 10 in an effort to build stronger ties between them and the U.S. The team, consisted of Col. Gen. Ivan Rusnak, First Minister of Defense, Ukraine; Lt. Gen Anatoliy Syrotenko, Commandant, Ukraine National Defense University; and Command Sgt. Maj. Oleksandr Kosnyski, Command Senior Enlisted Leader of the Armed Forces, Ukraine. The group spent the day receiving briefings from the NCOL CoE team.



BAINBRIDGE ETHICS PAPER

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Ethics are an integral part of establishing order and a sound moral foundation in any organization. In the absence of a good ethical foundation, particularly in the Army, disorder occurs. One of the most destructive unethical behaviors found in the Army is the presence of domestic violence perpetrated by Soldiers. There are many contributing factors that create a higher than national average level of domestic abuse in the military. Factors such as increased stress from deployments, frequent moves, and financial difficulties impact Soldiers more than civilians.

The most violent place in America is not dark alleys in cities, it is not biker bars or prisons. The most violent place in America is the home. One in three violent crimes occur in or near the victim's home. Violent crimes include murder, rape, and sexual, aggravated, or simple assault. In 2016, there were 1.29 million reported victims of violent crimes committed by an acquaintance, either intimate or casual. Nearly one million were victimized at or near their home (Office of Justice Program, 2016).

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the ethical issue of domestic assault that occurs within the U.S. Army. Included in this paper is the root cause of domestic assault, its impact on the force, and recommended solutions. As Army professionals, when unethical actions such as domestic abuse occur, the credibility of the profession is diminished. This is why senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) need to be the role model of ethical behaviors.

Root Cause

From 2003 to 2010 domestic violence in the U.S. declined; however, among Army members, the number rose 177 percent. The reason associated with the increase in domestic violence within the Army is Soldiers returning from deployments with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI). Other reasons for a higher rate of domestic violence in the Army include increased stress from rigorous training and deployments, frequent moves, and financial burdens (domesticshelter.org, 2016).

To explain other causes of domestic violence which occur in the Army one must look at the psyche of the individual. Domestic abuse commonly occurs when one partner feels the need to control or dominate the other. This can occur for reasons such as; low self-esteem, extreme jealousy, inability to regulate anger, or when they feel their partner is inferior to them in importance. The use of alcohol of course perpetuates the cycle of abuse (Goldsmith, 2016).

In the Army, it is possible that there are many marriages where both members are Soldiers and are of different ranks. With the hierarchical structure of the Army, and the importance put on respecting rank, this may lead to conflicts within the marriage. Also, in marriages where there is only one Soldier, it may be difficult for the Soldier to leave their rank, power, and influence at work. These are not excuses, but conceivable possibilities why the rate of domestic abuse is so much higher in the Army.

The high rate of domestic abuse in the Army influences readiness, public perception, retention, but most of all, the victims. The next section will discuss specific impacts domestic violence has on the Army.

Impact on the Force

The impact of domestic violence on the military results in monetary costs to support the victims, the premature discharge of personnel, and a negative public perception of the profession. Often abused spouses hesitate to report the abuse for fear that it will impact their spouse's career in the military. In a study performed by the Department of Defense (DoD), service members reported for abuse have a 23 percent higher chance of being discharged. Typically, they are discharged in a less than honorable status,

meaning they lose their job and the benefits of being in the military (Powers, 2017).

The Crime Victims Compensation Act resulted in the creation of a compensation program which financially assists the victims and their families and encourages them to report the abuser. Although the Federal Government does not have a national crime victim compensation program, every state in the U.S. does. The victim contacts the state where it happened, and in the case of military members, the state where the installation is located. The funding for this program comes from the individual states (National Center for Victims of Crime, 2012).

The Army Transitional Compensation Program, on the other hand, is a congressionally authorized program specifically catering to abused dependents of the Army. The criteria for receiving compensation is that a Soldier must have been court-martialed or administratively separated for a dependent abuse offense. This effects the force two-fold. One, the Soldier is no longer part of the force, and two the budget of the Army pays to compensate the victim. Depending on the number of children of the abused victim, the compensation can exceed \$50,000 per abused dependent (Army OneSource, 2018).

Domestic violence effects the force by decreasing the good order and discipline of the unit. This is especially damaging when the accused is an NCO or officer, who are stewards of the profession. When domestic abuse occurs, but is never reported, this adds stress to Army dependents, and leaves a mentally and emotionally unstable abuser within the ranks. This person could be deployed, or worse, be charged with leading Soldiers. The Army has implemented and attempted to implement many programs aimed at decreasing domestic violence. The next section will discuss some of these programs and define a solution not currently used.

Solutions

The impact of domestic violence in the U.S. military has caught the eye of the DoD. The DoD is currently working to decrease the complexity of dealing with civilian law enforcement. When the abuse occurs off-post, local police do not have to report the incident to military officials, so often the military does not know when an offense has occurred. There are efforts to realign laws that will grant military leaders the rights to details of an abuse. (Examples of such abuses are when a soldier has been assaulted by a civilian, or service-member's intimate partner, off-post.) This will ensure victims and dependents protection by the Family Advocacy System (Powers, 2017).

In 1987, it was declared that October would be Domestic Violence Awareness Month, and in 2015, the U.S. Army joined the nation in observing it. By doing so, the Army emphasized that domestic violence would never be acceptable, and could result in the end of an Army career. The awareness and prevention measures the Army implemented are: the development of life and coping skills; the support of positive relationships; the encouragement of help-seeking; and the report of abusive incidences. The Army offers many programs such as resiliency training for both Soldiers and their spouses, the Strong Bonds marriage retreat, and military family life consultants (Stand-To, 2015). The outcomes of current programs and recommended solutions are better explained when viewed through an ethical lens.

The three ethical lenses used to make a decision are rule-based, outcomes-based, and virtues-based reasoning. Rules-based ethical reasoning is the simple act of holding Soldiers accountable when violating the domestic abuse law. One of the rules is the Lautenberg Amendment. This amendment prohibits anyone convicted of a domestic assault from owning and/or carry a weapon. The Course of Action (COA) for a Soldier convicted using the Lautenberg Amendment, is to be discharged from the Army. Being discharged from the Army would obviously ruin a Soldier's military career. Knowing this, and knowing that it is mandatory for military leaders to report when a Soldier commits domestic violence, can cause a leader to choose to cover up a domestic assault or encourage victims not to report it. This choice goes against all of the ethics the Army embraces.

Virtues-based ethical reasoning aligns personal values with the values of the organization, in this case the seven Army values. An example of this is mandatory training for Soldiers to spread awareness of domestic abuse. When using the time for this training, time for mission essential training is reduced. This creates an ethical dilemma; train to stop domestic abuse, or train to be safe and successful during mis-

sions. As a Sergeant Major, consultation for decisions such as these are likely to occur. One idea to solve this problem would be to incorporate domestic assault awareness with Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) or Family Readiness Group (FRG) events, such as a family five-kilometer walk/run followed by a family picnic.

The Army has programs in place to increase awareness, and legal policies in place when dealing with the abuser. There are programs to financially help the victims through DoD and state agencies, but there are currently not any programs in place to screen and identify Soldiers who are prone to this type of conduct. Domestic abuse, much like sexual assault, harassment, and suicide, are all concerns Army leaders continually address, as some Soldiers choose these actions over the Army values and ethics.

One recommended solution is to provide more accurate and conclusive mental health screening. In 2011, mental disorders resulted in more hospitalizations of service-members than any other diagnostic category. These disorders created marital, family, and interpersonal relationship stresses, often resulting in increased risks of domestic violence and suicides. In a 12-year study conducted using the mental health screening of military personnel, over 936,000 active component members were diagnosed with at least one mental illness. With the recent discovery of diagnosing PTSD and TBI with blood tests and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), all potential recruits could be screened for mental disorders such as PTSD and TBI to reduce the rate of domestic abuse. Unfortunately, mental illness resulting in abuse can have generational effects. Children exposed to domestic or sexual violence are over two-times more likely to repeat the behaviors as adults, and 70% are likely to have developed childhood PTSD (Hart, 2001). It is critical, then, that the cycle of abuse is stopped.

By using the Ethical Reasoning Model, we can determine if a solution is ethical. Current mental health screening is completed by the recruit completing a questionnaire. Diagnosing their mental health is then subjectively done by looking at the questionnaire results. A recruit can choose to be dishonest in his/her answer, and thus their true mental health may not be known until an offense occurs. If a recruit really wants to enlist, they will face the ethical dilemma of being honest and risk not being able to enlist, or lying and enlisting.

In looking at these approaches by their outcomes, the screening of potential recruits seems to have the best potential for reducing abuse. However, making it a requirement for all enlistees to submit to either a blood test, MRI, or both, may stigmatize mental health disorders such as childhood PTSD/TBI. It also might decrease the recruiting pool by assuming that a person who shows positive signs of PTSD/TBI by childhood trauma is not capable of being a good Soldier with high ethical behavior, even though this trauma may have been successfully overcome.

This section used the Ethical Reasoning Model, and looked at current and practical solutions to the issue of domestic abuse. It is a complex problem with focus on the abuser and victims after abuse has occurred. Sergeant's Major need to be clear that domestic violence is a choice and not an illness, and will not be tolerated by any Soldier, regardless of rank.

Conclusion

This paper examined the ethical issue of domestic abuse which occurs in the Army. The factors causing domestic abuse in the Army include increased stress from deployments, frequent moves, and financial difficulties. An underlying cause is the number of Soldiers currently serving with pre-existing mental conditions such as PTSD. The prevalence of domestic assaults can decrease if mental health screening using modern diagnostic techniques. The cost to the force is both monetary, in the form of compensation payments to victims, and decreased readiness by early discharges. Leaders must use ethical lenses when deciding the COA to take when dealing with domestic violence prevention/awareness and when reporting abusers. This begins with having a no tolerance message for every unit in the Army.

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Photo by David Crozier, Command Communications

Command Sgt. Maj. Timothy Guden, Training and Doctrine Command senior enlisted leader visited The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence August 10 to be a part of the opening ceremonies for Sergeants Major Course Class 69. After the ceremony he took some time to recognize several personnel for their outstanding work in support of the NCO professional Development System. For their hard work he presented each a coin for excellence.

GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

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Within the past year, the U.S. Army officially opened all military occupational specialties (MOSs) to women but the role of women in the military, specifically in a combat capacity, continues to remain a contentious and volatile topic. The purpose of this paper is to examine the challenges associated with a gender-integrated military. This paper explores the role of the U.S. Army, the history of U.S. Army gender integration efforts, and the impact of military culture and physical standards on integration efforts. While the U.S. Army has removed the last institutional barrier to women serving, human dynamics and military culture make successful integration of women into the military a more complicated issue.

The Role of the U.S. Army

As the land component of the Department of Defense (DoD), the mission of the U.S. Army is to “fight and win our nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations” (Department of the Army, n.d.). The institutional Army trains, equips, deploys, and ensures the readiness of the operational Army, which conducts full-spectrum operations around the globe (Department of the Army, n.d.). The U.S. Army has a long history of institutional barriers that have limited the ability of commanders to pick the most capable person for the job (Barry, 2013)

Break Down the Institutional Barriers: A Historical Overview

Institutional barriers are “policies, procedures, or situations that systematically disadvantage certain groups of people” and they can exist in any situation where there is a majority-minority group (National Center for Women & Information Technology, n.d.). In 1942, the U.S. Army established the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps; female Soldiers did not receive overseas pay or government life insurance, and their families could not collect the death gratuity (Department of the Army, n.d.). In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt removed the term auxiliary, and it became the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) (Department of the Army, n.d.). Even though the WAC was part of the regular Army and gave women the same rights and benefits as male Soldiers, it still excluded women from serving in numerous MOSs (United States General Accounting Office, n.d.). In 1977, the U.S. Army expanded opportunities for female Soldiers and opened many previously closed MOSs to women, including some aviation jobs; this brought the U.S. Army one step closer to a fully gender-integrated force (United States General Accounting Office, n.d.).

The Risk Rule

In 1988, the Department of Defense (DoD) implemented a policy called the Risk Rule (United States General Accounting Office, n.d.). The Risk Rule barred women from noncombat units or missions if the “risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture were equal to or greater than the risk in the combat units they supported” (United States General Accounting Office, n.d.). However, Operation Desert Storm highlighted a new kind of warfare where “everyone in [the] theater was at risk” and led the DoD to rescind the Risk Rule (Barry, 2013).

The Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule

Aspin (1994), former Secretary of Defense, wrote a memorandum to the Service Secretaries titled the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule. In it, the DoD defined direct ground combat as “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew-served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel” (Aspin, 1994). This memo stated that the military services were to use the guidance within the memorandum to expand opportunities for women. However, the memorandum prohibited women from serving in any unit below a brigade level if that unit’s principal mission was to engage in direct ground combat (Aspin, 1994).

A Fully Gender-Integrated Army

In 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta rescinded the memorandum and directed the military services open all occupations and units to females no later than the beginning of 2016 (Department of the Army, 2016). In 2015, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced there would not be any exceptions and directed the Services to execute the implementation of their integration plans (Department of the Army, 2016). The changes to policy removed one of the last remaining institutional glass ceilings for women and finally aligned policy with practice, as the asymmetrical threat of modern warfare had already pushed women to the abstract front lines of war (Barry, 2013). Under the new policy, all Soldiers, depending on their capabilities and the needs of the U.S. Army instead of their gender, can serve in any MOS, which allows the Army to recruit Soldiers from a larger pool of qualified individuals. That same year, the U.S. Army released Soldier 2020, the U.S. Army’s gender integration implementation plan to create a standards-based Army.

Soldier 2020

Soldier 2020 outlines the Army’s plan to cultivate a climate of trust in which all Soldiers can thrive and achieve their full potential. Soldier 2020 enhances force readiness and allows leaders to select the best-qualified Soldier for the job, regardless of gender (Department of the Army, 2016). Even though there are no longer any institutional barriers to women serving in the military, the topic of women serving in the military, particularly in combat, still elicits a wide variety of emotions that make successful integration a challenge.

U.S. Army Culture: A Barrier to Successful Integration

In 1981, a research scientist for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences speculated that if women make up more than thirty-five percent of a unit, then it would negatively impact unit performance (Woelfel, 1981). In 1991, General Barrow, the 27th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, said that women in combat would do what the enemies of the U.S. had never been able to do, destroy it (Barrow, 1991). In 1997, a U.S. Army chaplain publically championed against the integration of females on the basis that “[females will] be tempted to use their sexuality to garner special favors” (Bump, 2017). More recently a Navy Seal Commander said, “in more than twenty years [I have] never heard anyone explain what women can do, and how they would help rather than hurt my teams” (Simons, 2000). These paradigms about females do not disappear overnight just because the U.S. Army removed the institutional barriers to women serving; they illustrate the culture that permeates the senior ranks of the military and slows the process of successful integration of females.

The fundamental purpose of the military is to fight wars and as such the U.S. Army has a unique culture (Titunik, 2000). As part of Soldier 2020, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted a gender integration study (GIS) to help develop the U.S. Army’s gender integration strategy. The GIS study found five barriers to successful integration: inconsistent enforcement or existing standards and perceptions of double standards, incidents of unprofessional behavior and indiscipline, fear of sexual harassment and or assault, cultural stereotypes, and ignorance of Army policy (U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center, 2015).

Another study of attitudes toward women in the military and combat showed that masculine ideologies, gendered propositions, and sexism bias one’s perception of a Soldier more than their physical or physiological capabilities (Young & Nauta, 2013). Another study found the very men that women serve alongside in

the military each day are the very people who are least accepting of them being in the military in general and specifically in a combat role (Laurence, Milavec, Rohall, Ender, & Matthews, 2016). Additional research supported this assertion and claimed women are more likely to meet a man who supports their career choice at the bookstore or a bar than they are within their units (Young & Nauta, 2013). These conclusions are not a surprise given the quotes from U.S. military senior leaders regarding this topic throughout the years.

Additionally, there is an assumption that gender integration will lead to an increase in inappropriate relationships between Soldiers. A professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School said: “we all know what happens when young men and women spend immense time together in close proximity” (Simons, 2015). Seventy-one percent of combat arms Soldiers believe that integration will lead to fraternization and ninety percent expect fraternization to occur more frequently (U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center, 2015). This simplistic view is as ridiculous as the presumption that allowing homosexuals to serve in the military openly would lead to an increase in male-on-male or female-on-female sexual assaults. It did not. While inappropriate relationships are always a concern, there is little evidence to support claims that integration will lead to a rise in them. Inappropriate relationships happen now, and they will occur in the future, but correlation does not equal causation. In fact, a study that examined social associations in mixed-gender groups shows that men and women are more likely to develop brother and sister type friendships than sexual relationships (Bettleheim, 1969).

Physical Capability: Can a Woman Do a Man’s Job?

Another common theme found in research concerning a gender-integrated Army is concern over a women’s physical capability to perform specific jobs. Allowing men and women to compete for all military specialties should not be an equal rights issue, but one of military effectiveness (Atkinson, 2007). In the U.S. Army, a Soldier’s physical capability is critical to the success of their mission. Currently, 85 percent of combat arms Soldiers believe public pressure will force the U.S. Army to lower standards (U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center, 2015).

These are valid concerns as a female’s body composition is different from a male’s body composition. The average female recruit is 4.8 inches shorter, 32 pounds lighter, and has 37 fewer pounds of muscle, but six more pounds of body fat, than the average male recruit (United States Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, 1992).

Additionally, on average a female recruit only has 55 percent of the upper body strength, and 72 percent of the lower body strength of males. Gender-neutral standards, especially concerning physical fitness assessments, will be a critical component to reducing negative perceptions and stereotypes, which will enable the U.S. Army to affect the culture. The current physical fitness assessment double standards contribute to the fact that four out of five combat arms Soldiers believe that unit effectiveness will decrease in the future because criteria will change to ensure female Soldiers are successful (U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center, 2015).

Army Physical Fitness Test

The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) is a scaled physical assessment with categories based on gender and age groups. Male Soldiers believe these gender-specific and double standards are unfair and that the U.S. Army is giving unspoken acknowledgment that women are weaker than men (U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center, 2015). For example, while both male and female Soldiers between 17 and 21 years old must complete 78 sit-ups within two minutes to achieve a perfect score, this is the only event where the standards are gender-neutral (Department of the Army, 2012). Male Soldiers must complete 71 pushups within two minutes to attain a perfect score, but female Soldiers in the same age range only must do 42 pushups, which is 29 fewer pushups than their male counterparts, to achieve the same perfect score (Department of the Army, 2012). Additionally, male Soldiers must run two miles two minutes and 26 seconds faster than female Soldiers, coming in at 13 minutes flat to achieve a perfect score, while female Soldiers have 15 minutes and 36 seconds and achieve the same score (Department of the Army, 2012). Without clear,

operationally-grounded, and equally-enforced standards, stereotypes, perceptions, and biases for qualified women to attain respect in newly opened combat arms career fields. However, even though research shows that military culture and physical standards continue to serve as barriers to successful integration, other studies state that over time, gender issues will fall as women's enlistments in the military continues to increase (Titunik, 2000).

Integration is not a New Concept

Despite the challenges military culture and physical standards present to successful integration, the U.S. Army has shown it is both willing and capable of adapting to needed change. This is not the first time that integration has divided the U.S. Army. In 1948, President Harry Truman met significant resistance as he sought to integrate African Americans. Even General Omar Bradley, the Army Chief of Staff at the time, publicly spoke out in favor of segregation. More recently in 2010, leaders clung to similar arguments when they tried to prevent the U.S. military from allowing homosexuals to serve in the military openly (Bump, 2017).

Cone (2016), a retired U.S. Army general, believes that the U.S. Army has a chance to seize the opportunity to implement gender-neutral high organizational standards of performance while still supporting women in combat units. Despite the amount of research that shows military culture and physical capability will continue to prevent successful integration, results also show that many combat-arms Soldiers have displayed a willingness to take any Soldier, regardless of gender, who meets operationally driven and established standards (Cone, 2016). Additionally, there is not a mass exodus of females from combat support and combat service support MOSs to combat arms to let this integration effort warrant the division it currently causes within the U.S. Army's ranks. In a 2014 DoD survey, 92 percent of females expressed no interest in switching to combat arms (Baldor, 2014).

The DoD held a Women in Combat Symposium in 2014 which found that while women's fitness levels are lower than men's, there are currently no gender-neutral standards to either confirm or invalidate concerns related to performance standards (Tepe, Yarnell, Nindl, Van Arsdale, & Deuster, 2016). Additionally, female Soldiers can improve their level of physical fitness through a good training program. Often in debates regarding physical fitness, Soldiers judge females with a zero defect mentality. While it is true that on average women are physically weaker than men, there are also plenty of male Soldiers who either fail the APFT or are not adequate for combat MOSs. The word Soldier is gender neutral; U.S. Army Soldiers must stop thinking of each as either male or female, they must start thinking of each other as capable, or not capable, ready, or not ready, regardless of gender. The U.S. Army must put operationally-grounded, gender-neutral standards in place for this to happen.

Successfully integrating females into the U.S. Army is a no-fail mission. The DoD has made the decision. The Warrior Ethos state, "I will always place the mission first" and the U.S. Army cannot forget the focus is to fight and win our nation's wars; as such, allowing men and women serve in every MOS is not an equal rights issue, it is an effectiveness issue. The U.S. Army needs the right Soldier, in the right job, at the right time. The U.S. Army has adapted to change before, and it will adjust to change again. Most importantly, U.S. Army Soldiers will prove former Marine Corps Commandant General Barrow wrong, and it will not allow females to destroy what the enemy could not.

Conclusion

The operating environment is rapidly changing, and the asymmetrical threat of modern warfare has blurred the lines between non-combat and combat roles. As a result, the U.S. Army officially opened all MOSs to female Soldiers. However, the role of women in the military, specifically in a combat capacity, remains a contentious and volatile topic. This paper explored the role of the U.S. Army, the history of U.S. Army gender integration efforts, and the impact of military culture and physical standards on integration efforts. This paper examined the U.S. Army's gender integration initiative and discussed the challenges associated with a gender-integrated military. While the U.S. Army has removed all institutional barriers to women serving, human dynamics and military culture make successful integration of women into the mili-

tary a more complicated issue.

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Photo by David Crozier, Command Communications

The NCO Leadership Center of Excellence held their quarterly Distinguished Service and Recognition ceremony where it celebrated the retirements of several of its cadre. At every DSR the CoE also recognizes the service of an area veteran. On September 7 they recognized Vietnam Veteran, Anthony Talamo, a retired Air Force major who served 22 years. He flew C-141 Starlighter aircraft flying supplies in and out of Vietnam.

DEFEATING ISIS IN IRAQ: A RACE AGAINST TIME

By Master Sgt. Mark A. Millare

Class 68, United States Army Sergeants Major Academy

President Barrack Obama's policy to use the military instrument of national power as a last resort was poignantly accurate and remains a true testament to his aversion of employing large-scale military interventions overseas (Bentley, Holland, Quinn & Fuller, 2017). No other president in recent history took such a statement to heart and meant it. Obama's strategy to support Iraqi forces in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), rather than sending American ground troops to destroy ISIS, was a manifestation of his aversion to American military involvement abroad. For most of the world, Obama's approach of restraint meant a fundamental shift in American politics and one that signified the limits of American responsibilities in Iraq. For Iraq, this meant the government and its army must regroup, prepare and lead the fight against ISIS. However, for some, particularly Obama's most ardent critics, this restraint was a sign of weakness that further encouraged America's historical adversaries to challenge the political and military influence of the United States (US) in the world stage (Aftandilian, 2016; West, 2016). However, does the ISIS strategy aim to assert American political and military might, or does it aim to achieve a simple goal, which is to defeat ISIS in the most cost-effective way with the least number of American casualties?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the efficacy of Obama's strategy in defeating ISIS in Iraq. It begins with a brief description of the operational environments in Iraq and the United States, an important factor to create context on the circumstances that shaped Obama's strategy against ISIS. Particularly, how Iraq's political failures contributed to the resurgence of a weakened Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to a more potent and brutal terrorist organization in ISIS. Additionally, the paper continues with an examination of Obama's strategy to degrade and ultimately, defeat ISIS as viewed through Lykke's model of ends, ways, and means (Meiser, 2017). Furthermore, the paper closes with an assessment as to how Obama's light footprint strategy measured up to the expectations of its supporters and critics. Central to the strategy's assessment was how the time required to achieve the objective in Iraq vindicate or condemn the overall success of the strategy. Ultimately, even though Obama's light footprint strategy failed to satisfy the public's appetite for demanding immediate results, it still proved to be an effective and sustainable strategy for defeating the ISIS insurgency in Iraq.

The Operating Environments

When US forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, no one could have predicted the rise of ISIS and the campaign of terror it would unleash to the world three years later. It was not until early 2014, when ISIS routed a numerically superior Iraqi army in Mosul, that the United States acknowledged the ISIS threat and began targeting ISIS positions in Syria and Iraq (Department of the Army, 2017). ISIS' overwhelming victory in Mosul exposed the failures of Maliki's government to convince the Sunni minority to embrace the Shia-led government in Baghdad. Mosul's predominantly Sunni population of two million, long-frustrated of Maliki's vengeful policies against them, openly supported the ISIS advance and greatly contributed to the stunning collapse of the Iraqi Army defenses in the city (Sharp, 2014; Robinson et al., 2017). Soon after, the northern cities of Tikrit, Ramadi, Samarra, and Fallujah also fell to ISIS hands. It took American intervention, in terms of sustained air strikes pounding ISIS positions in Iraq, to halt the ISIS advance.

As Americans watched the humiliating defeats of the Iraqi army against the brutal ISIS onslaught, the

pressure for the Obama administration to respond with swift military action was immense. For lawmakers and the military, there was an inherent drive to protect the priceless financial (over \$800 billion spent in the reconstruction of Iraq) and personal (over 5,000 lives lost during Operation Iraqi Freedom) investments made in Iraq (Mausner & Cordesman, 2011). Losing Iraq to insurgents, just three years after American withdrawal, was simply unacceptable and they demanded Obama to act immediately. Fortunately for the Obama administration, even when public outcry to act in Iraq was deafening, the war-weary public to include Republican hawks in Washington, fell short in demanding direct American military intervention in Iraq (Sharp, 2014; Dalton, 2017). Instead, critics were eager to highlight Obama's failing foreign policies instead of suggesting sending American ground troops to defeat ISIS in Iraq.

Particularly, blaming the US military's abrupt withdrawal from Iraq – Obama's campaign promise – as the reason for a defeated AQI in 2009 to rise to a more potent and powerful insurgent force in ISIS (Bentley et al., 2017). This hesitation to demand American ground forces to execute the fight against ISIS gave Obama the political latitude to execute a more prudent strategy to defeat ISIS in Iraq. A strategy that forced the Iraqi people to take responsibility for their own country and one that is less costly to American lives and resources (Jones, 2014). Obama chose to employ a light footprint strategy and the Iraqi army would take the lead in the ground campaign against ISIS.

The Light Footprint Strategy

The light footprint strategy requires a combination of air power, intelligence enablers, special operation forces, and contractors often leveraging relationships with allies and partner militaries to take the active role of engaging insurgent threats in their country (Lujan, 2013). For Obama, this strategy was worth a try considering his reluctance to commit the American military in another conflict in the Middle East (Bentley et al., 2017). Additionally, the strategy would not entail high financial costs and did not totally discount the competence and reliability of the Iraqi Forces. For Obama, relying on the Iraqi military was a priority because it vehemently supported his previous narrative that the Iraqi's were ready for self-determination back in 2011 (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). The same narrative rationalized the US military's withdrawal from Iraq that same year. The examination of Obama's light footprint strategy in Iraq begins with an analysis using Lykke's model of ends, ways, and means (Meiser, 2017).

Ends

Obama's end state was the total ISIS defeat in Iraq by, with, and through the coordinated actions of trained and capable Iraqi Security Forces under the strategic control of Abadi's Iraqi government in Baghdad (Bentley et al., 2017). This was a particularly important end state because it clearly restricted the direct combat involvement of American troops in the fight against ISIS. American forces will only accompany, advice, assist, and enable the Iraqi Security Forces' combined arms operations in the campaign against ISIS (Department of the Army, 2017). Since the force required to execute the strategy was minimal compared to a large-scale deployment, the strategy not only provided an effective response but also maintained the US military's operational reach in the region without stretching it too thin to react to threats in other areas. Additionally, with American and coalition partners in support, the strategy eliminated the possibility of stirring up local resentments that bolstered ISIS propaganda and recruitment in the region (McManus, 2014). To achieve the end state, coalition forces would utilize air and ground assets to support the Iraqi offensive on the ground.

Ways and Means

The strategy required the employment of coalition air and ground assets (means) to enable three critical efforts (ways). These efforts were as follows: (1) attack and degrade ISIS command nodes and high-value targets in Iraq and Syria, (2) support the Iraqi Security Forces assault through close air support and indirect fires, and (3) disrupt ISIS financial and recruitment networks to reduce the influx of cash flow and foreign fighters into Iraq (Morrissey, 2015). Degrading ISIS capabilities was a top priority following the fall of Mosul. At its height in 2014, ISIS controlled over 100,000 square kilometers of territory and expanding (De-

partment of the Army, 2017). Fortunately, coalition air strikes against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria helped halt its rapid advance inside Iraq. Although not a preferred method to win back territories lost to ISIS in Iraq, the air campaign nevertheless succeeded in containing the ISIS advance and degrading its fighters. By the end of 2016, coalition forces conducted over 17,000 air strikes against 31,900 ISIS targets, killing an approximate 23,000 ISIS fighters (Dalton, 2017; Nance, 2016).

The air campaign succeeded in containing ISIS and more importantly, provided the Iraqi Security Forces the valuable time needed to reorganize, train, equip, and prepare its forces in the upcoming offensive against ISIS. Now, with the support of coalition air and integrated fires, Iraqi army units, augmented by Shia militias and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, took the offensive against ISIS in Iraq. This time, Iraqi forces were unequivocally in the lead, fielding levels of organizational confidence, trust, and respect necessary to win against ISIS fighters on the ground (Volesky & Noble, 2017). By 2015, just a year after their impressive victory in Mosul, ISIS was clearly on the defensive. ISIS lost over 25% of its territory and its offensive to capture Palmyra in Syria resulted in a stunning defeat (Nance, 2016). In Iraq, the campaign to take back Iraqi territory was progressing, albeit slowly. Iraqi forces liberated Tikrit (April 2015), Ramadi (March 2016), Fallujah (June 2016) and Mosul fell to Iraqi hands in July 2017, after an intense nine-month campaign (Department of the Army, 2017). Complementing the ground offensive was the systematic attack on ISIS financing and recruitment infrastructures around the world.

Success against ISIS required a strategy that disrupted its financial and recruitment activities. The strategy involved operational and strategic approaches. The operational approach included targeting of personnel and infrastructure in Iraq and Syria to disrupt cash flows and revenues (Department of Defense, 2017). Destroying oil refineries and related infrastructures in ISIS-controlled areas helped disrupt a \$500 million a year revenue-stream for ISIS (Lister, 2014). The strategic approach involved employing financial intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to assist partner nations in identifying and disrupting monetary transactions that fed directly into ISIS coffers. Partnerships also helped disrupt other sources of ISIS revenues that derived from selling antiquities in the black market, robbery, extortion, and kidnap for ransom activities (Department of Homeland Security, 2016). Additionally, coalition forces leveraged unilateral and partner-sponsored information operations to counter ISIS propaganda. Close cooperation through coordinated law enforcement and intelligence sharing also disrupted the flow of foreign fighters both to and from the conflict areas (Government Accountability Office, 2017). Restrictions on foreign travel and border enforcement helped mitigate the flow of foreign fighters in the region, limiting ISIS' ability to recoup fighters they lost on the ground.

The successful campaign to liberate Mosul and the rest of ISIS-held territories in Iraq took an estimated two years to complete. As Iraqi and American forces celebrate the tactical victories in Iraq, Al-Abadi's government in Baghdad must now follow military victories with required political reforms to rebuild a battered nation and bring a disenfranchised Sunni minority into the democratic process. Only through political, social and economic reforms could a truly young democratic Iraq fend off the threats of insurgency inside and outside its borders.

Additionally, initial ISIS successes mobilized Islamic radicals from all over the world to travel to Syria and fight under the ISIS flag. It demonstrated to the world how effective the ISIS ideology was in recruiting the Muslim youth to their cause. As Iraq hoped to find reconciliation with the Sunnis, world leaders must also find needed socio-economic reforms that hope to address the root cause of radicalization of the world's young Muslim populace. It was a task Obama's successor would have to face. For now, he found vindication that his light footprint strategy to defeat ISIS in Iraq resulted in resounding success.

Aftermath

Obama's light foot print strategy achieved its economic and military objectives. Unfortunately, some critics would measure the strategy's success against the opportunities it missed and the threats it underwrote throughout the campaign to defeat ISIS. Particularly sensitive was the two years it took Iraqi and coalition forces to defeat ISIS in Iraq. In these two years, ISIS orchestrated and inspired attacks terrorized the world, spreading fear and brutality from the Middle East to the west. From January 2015 to March 2016 alone, 84

ISIS-directed and inspired attacks occurred across the world, taking over 1,010 lives and countless more wounded (Yourish, Watkins & Giratikanon, 2016). Unfortunately, this death toll did not even include the tens of thousands more that perished under direct ISIS rule.

Furthermore, to the Republican hawks in Washington, Obama's reluctance to employ America's military machine to defeat ISIS undoubtedly showed his out-of-touch fecklessness that continues to weaken American resolve throughout the region and the world (Shear & Baker, 2015). As a result, adversaries continue to challenge American power and influence in the world stage. Russian aircraft buzz over American warships, Iran captures American sailors, and China's military expansions continue unchallenged in the South China Sea (West, 2016).

As initial ISIS attacks shocked the world and critics pounced at every opportunity to attack his strategy, Obama stood by his decision to let the Iraqi's fight their war. As pressure mounted, Obama moved to reassure the American public and sometimes the world that the strategy was working, albeit slowly (Dombrowski & Alpher, 2015). In fact, Holland (2015) argued that ISIS' shift to attack overseas was a sign of weakness, not strength. These attacks hoped to incite violence against Muslim communities in the west that feed to their propaganda and recruitment objectives. Supporters of the strategy also claimed that such a strategy forced the Iraqi government and its army to take responsibility for their country's future. The resulting tactical victories helped regain the pride of the Iraqi army and perhaps equally important, earned the confidence of the Iraqi people.

Supporters also believed the strategy presented a suitable alternative to large-scale military deployments. A reengagement in Iraq would undoubtedly cost American lives and billions more that could further strain America's precarious economic situation. Such mobilizations feed into ISIS propaganda, which fuels resentment against the west and perpetuating the cycle of violence in the region. Furthermore, by eliminating substantial military requirements in the Middle East, America's military might has the initiative and operational reach to face any threat around the world. It also provided the administration with the opportunity to exercise fiscal reforms that strengthened the American economy. A stable economy with an unconstrained military is the perfect apparatus to maintain America's dominance and national interests abroad. Rightfully so, the light foot print approach is the best strategy to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives as well as the fiscal efficacy the US needs to wage future unconventional and counterinsurgency campaigns.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper examined the efficacy of Obama's strategy in defeating ISIS in Iraq. Secondly, the paper highlighted the current operational environments in Iraq and the United States, which led Obama to employ a light footprint strategy to defeat ISIS. Thirdly, the paper continued with an examination of Obama's strategy in terms of the resources and actions required to achieve his overall end state. Furthermore, the paper closed with an assessment as to how Obama's light footprint strategy measured against the expectations of its supporters and critics. Particularly important was how Obama's critics focused on the slow progress of the ISIS strategy to assess its effectiveness and success. Ultimately, even though Obama's light footprint strategy failed to satisfy the public's appetite for demanding immediate results, it still proved to be an effective and sustainable strategy for defeating the ISIS insurgency in Iraq.

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
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AROUND THE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE



Photos by Spc. James Seals, Command Communications
With the beginning of each class year brings pomp and ceremony. But probably the more enjoyable events consist of a little team building, getting to know your community, and of course taking in the wild, wild west. Pictured from top to bottom are: Team IMSO shows off their horsemanship skills at the Prude Ranch just outside historic Fort Davis. The group was down there with the International students of Class 69 learning about the Western Expansion. Next, Class 69 students were greeted by numerous businesses from the Sun City of El Paso as a means to get to know one another. This annual event is sponsored by the El Paso Chamber of Commerce. Finally, Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmy Sellers, commandant of the NCOL CoE had another way to welcome Class 69, an early morning run!

E PLURIBUS UNUM – OUT OF MANY, ONE

By Warrant Officer 1 Craig Batty

Class 68, United States Army Sergeants Major Academy

In May 2017, I moved from Australia to the United States of America (the U.S.) in order to commence studies as an International Military Student (IMS) at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), in El Paso, Texas. As a student under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, I embarked on a journey not just to complete the curriculum of the USASMA, but on a cultural experience, reinforced at the local, state, and federal level, as a shared experience with my family. This cultural experience, initially gained through being a member of the El Paso local community included experiences during participation in the Field Studies Program (FSP). The purpose of this paper is to highlight our cultural experience in the U.S. and during the FSP, conducted by the International Military Student Office (IMSO). U.S. society, by example, lives up to its motto of 'E Pluribus Unum' and it has been a privilege to live and be a part of that, even if only for a brief moment in time.

U.S. Culture – Thank you for Your Service

Living as a member of the El Paso community was in itself a comprehensive cultural experience, at the local level. While we expected the culture of the U.S. to be very similar to that of Australia, what we found overwhelmingly different was the privilege extended to serving military personnel by the local, state, and federal community. We found that, regardless of the difference in uniform, the community saw me as one of the 'trusted professionals' by which U.S. service men and woman are clearly known. To be 'thanked', nearly on a daily basis, with the phrase 'thank you for your service' has been culturally different. While there are many aspects to American culture, we found this to be the most profound. This occurred almost daily during our travels and we witnessed it consistently while traveling during the state and federal FSP.

The Field Studies Program

While living as members of the local El Paso community was the start point of our cultural experience in the U.S., the FSP broadened the cultural experience. The goal of the FSP program is "to ensure that international students return to their homelands with an understanding of the responsibilities of governments, militaries, and citizens to protect, preserve, and respect the rights of every individual" (Department of the Army, 2011, p. 210). The FSP, tailored as an experience at the local, state, and federal level, sought to meet this goal. The FSP provided each student, both FMS and those International Military Education and Training (IMET) sponsored students, including our families, an itinerary to promote the required understanding.

The local FSP, conducted over 31 July to 11 August 2017, introduced IMS to diversity and American life, U.S. government institution, political processes, the judicial system, the free market system, health and human services; all facets of the FSP, as found in Army Regulation 12-15. The visits within the local community were extensive and provided a good start point to understand the culture of the community in which we were living. While families were not included in the local FSP, my wife embedded herself into the local community through attendance on the Spouse Leadership Development Course and my daughter volunteered at the El Paso Humane Society. Through our collective experiences within the local community, conditions were set for the experiences we were to face during the state and federal FSP. The state and federal FSPs, conducted over 23 to 27 October 2017 and 23 April to 05 May 2018, respectively, broadened even further the IMS, and family members, cultural experiences. Both continued to build on the goal of the FSP to ensure that all IMS, and their families, return to their homeland with a shared understanding

of American culture. The state and federal FSP reflected what we had observed in our local community. We continually witnessed a deep-rooted culture of thanking those who serve as being at the heart of American culture, as a sense of Nation-hood. We found the heart of this American culture invested in the birthplace of the National Flag and the National Anthem. Baltimore, the home of the Star Spangled Banner Museum and Fort McHenry, which is where we learned that the National Flag inspired the U.S. National Anthem. The respect shown by U.S. society to its service men and women who serve under both is an example to other cultures.

By Example

The U.S., as a society, leads by example in its respect to those that serve its country and by whose sacrifices America has prospered. Society's respect for its service men and woman as trusted professionals in pursuit of human rights, the law of war and as a global power in international peace and security enable it to live up to these facets as examples of American life. These facets are reflective of the U.S. motto 'E Pluribus Unum' or 'Out of Many, One', which has extended to its culture a value to those that serve. Out of many, under one National Flag and respect for the one National Anthem, which binds the culture as one; E Pluribus Unum.

Conclusion

As a student under the FMS program, I embarked on a journey not just to complete the curriculum of the USASMA, but on a cultural experience, reinforced at the local, state, and federal level, enabled by the FSP, as a shared experience with my family. The purpose of this paper was to highlight our cultural experiences in the U.S. and during the FSP, conducted by the IMSO. Those cultural experiences enabled us to see first-hand the history behind the U.S. National Flag, its National Anthem and respect for those that serve under both. U.S. society, by example, lives up to its motto of 'E Pluribus Unum' and it has been a privilege to live and be a part of that, even if only for a brief moment in time.

References

Department of the Army. (2011). Joint security cooperation and education training (Army regulation 12-15). Retrieved from: https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r12_15.pdf

*Photo by Spc. James Seals,
Command Communications*

The International Military students who attend the Sergeants Major Course are taken on Field Studies Program trips throughout the 10-month course to provide them with a better understanding of the United States, its people, political system, military, institutions, and way of life. In this photo the students are listening to a park ranger at Historic Fort Davis, to learn about the Westward Expansion. Fort Davis is one of the best surviving examples of an Indian Wars' frontier military post in the Southwest.





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